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Women have made great progress in gaining individual civil and political rights since the
1800s. However, for nearly a century, the use of couple-based tax and benefit provisions
has increased steadily, enshrouding women in new and extensive forms of fiscal coverture
that run counter to democratic ideals of economic equality. While the pros and cons of joint
taxation have been well-rehearsed, the reality is that between unequal distributions of new
and old varieties of tax and benefit items to women and men and the continued expansion of
joint tax and benefit items in recent decades, Canada’s tax and transfer system now diverts
substantial amounts of money away from women and into the hands of male taxpayers or
back into government coffers. This article demonstrates how fiscal systems now reinforce
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labour, incomes, and government benefits, and proposes that it is time to implement fully
individualized fiscal policies.
Depuis les années 1800, les femmes ont réalisé une avancée spectaculaire pour revendiquer
leurs droits civils et politiques. Depuis près d’un siècle toutefois, l’utilisation de dispositions
fiscales et sociales fondées sur le couple progresse sans relâche, plongeant les femmes
derrière une nouvelle forme sournoise de paravent fiscal qui s’oppose à l’idéal démocratique
de l’égalité économique. Même si le pour et le contre de la fiscalité partagée ont fait l’objet de
nombreuses discussions, la triste réalité est que, de la distribution inégale entre les hommes
et les femmes des nouvelles et des anciennes essences de mesures fiscales et sociales
à l’essor constant des dispositions fiscales et sociales partagées au cours des dernières
décennies, le régime fiscal et de transferts canadien détourne aujourd’hui des femmes
des sommes d’argent considérables pour les mettre entre les mains des contribuables
masculins ou les retourner dans les coffres de l’État. Cet article cherche à démontrer la
manière dont les régimes fiscaux renforcent aujourd’hui des modèles sexospécifiques
profondément enracinés d’affectation du travail des femmes, du revenu et des avantages
sociaux, et affirme qu’il est grand temps que soient mises en œuvre des politiques fiscales
totalement individualisées.
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[A] married woman who has earned $660 in any one year might just as
well … stop working for the rest of the year, unless she is going to earn
quite a large sum over and above that.1
Actions to be taken by Governments: Review and modify, with the full
and equal participation of women, … from a gender perspective, policies
and programmes—including those related to macroeconomic stability,
structural adjustment, external debt problems, taxation, investments,
employment, markets and all relevant sectors of the economy—with
respect to their impact … particularly on women … and adjust them

1.

“Married Women,” Saturday Night 57:43 (4 July 1942) 3 at 3.
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… to promote more equitable distribution of productive assets, wealth,
opportunities, income and services.2
[W]hen people say that we cannot afford to pay taxes to provide child and
elderly care services, presumably they are not saying that we can no longer
afford to look after our children or the elderly. What they must mean
is that instead of spreading the cost of these services equitably, through
the tax system, across the entire population, we should leave them to be
borne by women, by and large, who provide them … unpaid in their …
homes.3
THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF COVERTURE, or marital “covering,”4 began

to erode in the late 1800s as women gained statutory rights to enter into
employment contracts, own their own wages, and own property. By the time the
Income War Tax Act5 was enacted in 1917, women had begun receiving national
voting rights in Canada. They gained rights to hold political office in the late
1920s, and by 1985 were supposedly freed from the last artefacts of coverture
with the enactment of the sex equality provisions contained in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6 As early as 1919, however, it became clear that

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women (New York: United Nations,
1996) at 20-21 [UN, Fourth World Conference on Women].
Neil Brooks, “Taxation and the social legacy” (Paper delivered at the Australian Fabian
Society Conference - Investing in Ourselves: Fair and Effective Taxation for an Enterprising
Australia, Melbourne, 31 May 2003), online: <www.fabian.org.au/914.asp> [Brooks,
“social legacy”].
The common law doctrine of coverture originated in Roman civil law, which treated the
paterfamilias (“father of the family”) as incorporating all the civil capacities of all members of
the household, including wives, and the family or household as the basic social and juridical
unit. Civil codes achieved similar results with the husband’s power of management. This was
a purely private form of patriarchy because women could not be citizens of the Roman state
and thus had no public rights. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
translated by William Carey Jones (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1916) vol 1 at 625-34.
Income War Tax Act, 1917, SC 1917, c 28.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11.
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concepts of fiscal coverture7 would not be removed so easily from Canadian tax
and spending laws.8 Indeed, nearly a century later, fiscal coverture appears to be
more deeply entrenched than ever, with well over a hundred specific income tax
provisions treating spouses and now cohabitants as special forms of tax units.
The three passages quoted at the beginning of this article bracket the history
of fiscal coverture in Canada since 1919. The first passage9 was published in
1942. It reveals that tax impediments to married women’s paid work, which
were originally enacted to open up jobs for returning veterans after World War
I (WWI), were suddenly in the way again as Canada entered into World War II
(WWII). The power of fiscal coverture is revealed in the speed with which those
post-WWI income limits on married women’s income were repealed in 1942 and
then reinstated in even stricter form when veterans returned again.10
Fiscal coverture justifies the use of tax and spending laws built around the
“male breadwinner” model of adult relationships. In this model, women are
dependants, not providers, and work not for pay, but for the betterment of the
family unit. Use of tax and spending laws to uphold this model was considered
to be appropriate for married women during the early years of income taxation
because women’s fiscal beings were treated as having merged with their husbands’
as the two became ‘one’ when married. It is on this basis that public income
supports are still usually withheld from women who have husbands considered
to be responsible for supporting them, and tax benefits go to husbands who
7.

Fiscal coverture originally arose in English income taxation when married women’s earnings,
which were treated as belonging to the husband under the doctrine of coverture, were treated
as his income for tax purposes. Even after married women’s property legislation gave women
ownership of their own earnings, income tax legislation continued to include women’s
earnings as husbands’ incomes for tax purposes. The same result was achieved via husbands’
management of the matrimonial estate in civil code income tax systems. When women in
England protested the resulting over-taxation of their earnings, their husbands were given a
special deduction in 1894, but the benefits of that deduction remained the property of the
husbands. Nicholas A Barr, “The Taxation of Married Women’s Incomes—II” (1980) 6 Brit
Tax Rev 478 at 478-79.
8. The 1917 Income War Tax Act in Canada established women as individual taxpayers.
However, married individuals had access to double personal exemptions. During the 1920s,
this deduction was limited to couples in which the second spouse had very little income.
See Kathleen A Lahey, The Benefit/Penalty Unit in Income Tax Policy: Diversity and Reform
(Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2000) at 29 [Lahey, Benefit/Penalty Unit].
9. “Married Women,” supra note 1.
10. In 1942, the spousal deduction rules were amended to permit husbands to continue claiming
the deduction even if their wife was in paid work, and a new individual deduction was also
given to women in paid work. This was done to remove fiscal barriers to women’s war work.
At the end of the war, both changes were reversed in order to make sure that WWII veterans
would find employment. Lahey, Benefit/Penalty Unit, supra note 8 at 29.
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do support their wives. Indeed, in 1948, reinstatement of this form of fiscal
coverture was justified on the basis that the wartime rules that had removed tax
barriers to married women’s paid work had “sinned grievously against the general
fairness and equity of the income tax structure”11 by treating married women as
if they were single.
The second passage is from the United Nations (UN) Platform for Action
(Beijing Platform), adopted half a century later at the 1995 Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing.12 The Beijing Platform contains an exhaustive
list of specific equality-promoting steps that states agreed to take to implement
women’s internationally recognized equality rights. This text includes tax and other
fiscal provisions in the long list of economic and fiscal measures that states agree
to examine for their hidden effects on women. In so doing, it treats government
spending programs and revenue laws as two aspects of the same process: the
process by which states take responsibility for financing and delivering programs
that are designed to benefit the population as a whole, and not just members
of favoured groups. At the very least, this document committed signatories to
removing fiscal coverture rules from their statutes.
The third passage, written by Neil Brooks,13 enacts the gender perspectives
called for in the Beijing Platform and deftly uncovers the core assumption of
fiscal coverture—that women are still expected even in the twenty-first century
to perform the bulk of unpaid care work in the family unit. In this statement,
Brooks shifts the focus from sexist stereotypes to democratic principles of
equality of opportunity, sex equality, and equity, and addresses women as equally
deserving of policy consideration, respect, and resources that can equalize access
to incomes, caregiving, and wellbeing.
In fact, the paper in which he made this statement, entitled “Taxation
and Social Legacy,” is even more pertinent today. In this paper, he linked the
urgency of rejecting stereotyped and misleading systems of thought—about the
importance of taxation and about the dangers of gender hierarchies—directly to
the fact that fiscal policies devised to deal with present-day challenges always and
inevitably shape and create the future: “As taxes are reduced, and governments
become even more impotent to deal with social and economic problems, the
problems of social inequality will become even more exacerbated … [and] the
economic elite is ever more able to defend itself politically.”14
11. Wilfred Eggleston, “Income Tax Changes for Employed Wives,” Saturday Night 62:13 (30
November 1946) 8 at 8.
12. UN, Fourth World Conference on Women, supra note 2.
13. Brooks, “social legacy,” supra note 3.
14. Ibid.
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When this was published in 2003, Canada had already lost its status as
the highest-ranked country in terms of overall human and gender-related
development. Since 2003, Canada has fallen even further in these rankings—
down to eleventh on overall development and eighteenth on the UN gender
equality scale15—and is one of the five member countries of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with the fastest-growing
levels of inequality.16
Brooks’s concern with how the whole fiscal system, and tax law in particular,
affects ordinary people is one of the most powerful qualities of his work. From
the beginning of his academic career, he has treated sex, gender, and women’s
equality as part of what matters. He invited the prominent feminist lawyer Louise
Dulude to speak on family structure and taxation at a groundbreaking conference
on tax policy he organized in 1979. He set up a panel on the taxation unit
with Faye Woodman, Louise Dulude, and me and published the results in the
journal Canadian Taxation.17 Particularly because Stanley Surrey, one of the chief
proponents of the joint filing system adopted by the post-war US Congress, was
in attendance at this conference, Brooks brought important visibility to how tax
issues affect women. He also made sure that the Ontario Fair Tax Commission
included the Working Group on Women and Taxation as part of its review and
that women sat on the Working Group on Corporate Taxation. Throughout his
career, he has treated sex equality as a core goal of democratic fiscal policies in
his own scholarship and teaching. In open opposition to ideologies of gender in
fiscal studies, Brooks’s recognition that women are fiscal actors in their own right

15. United Nations Human Development Report Office, Human Development Report 2014,
UNDPOR, 2014, at 160, 172.
16. OECD, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (Paris: OECD, 2011) [OECD,
Divided We Stand]. The OECD found that income inequality grew more quickly in Canada
between 1980 and 2008 than in all but five other OECD countries. The richest 10% of the
Canadian population had incomes ten times as high as the poorest 10%, and the richest
1% of the population alone received 13.3% of total income. The OECD also pointed out
that these increases were due both to growing wage gaps and to less redistribution: “Taxes
and benefits reduce inequality less in Canada than in most OECD countries.” OECD,
Country Note: Canada, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (2011) [OECD,
Country Note: Canada].
17. Louise Dulude, Kathleen Lahey & Faye Woodman, “The Taxation Unit” (1979) 2 Can
Tax’n 19 at 19-20.
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provides important support to the proposition that tax, benefit, and other fiscal
laws should promote women’s full autonomy and equality, not undercut it.18
The good news is that in recent years, sex equality has been given more
attention in economic policy and even in discussions of fiscal policy. Critics of
almost all political orientations now at least acknowledge that tax barriers to
married women’s paid work undermine GDP growth.19 The “business case” for
sex equality links women’s increased involvement in paid work with improved
organizational performance.20 The “economic case” emphasizes that the increases
in state revenues resulting from women’s paid work can be used to support
education, health and care services, poverty reduction, and economic stability.21
The “wellbeing case” maintains that if women’s increased paid work time were
balanced with men’s increased unpaid work time, and if increased revenues were
directed to expanding care, education, and leisure resources, both women’s and
men’s health and wellbeing overall would increase.22 The “stability and recovery
case” goes further, with the OECD concluding that countries with higher levels of
gender equality have lower levels of income inequality, and fare better in dealing
with major crises and recessions.23 Indeed, as economic recoveries from the 2008

18. Neil Brooks, “The Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability” in John G
Head & Richard E Krever, eds, Tax Units and the Tax Rate Scale (Melbourne: Australian Tax
Research Foundation, 1996) 35; Neil Brooks & Thaddeus Hwong, The Social Benefits and
Economic Costs of Taxation: A Comparison of High- and Low-Tax Countries (Ottawa: Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2006).
19. OECD, Economic Policy Reforms 2011: Going for Growth (2011); OECD, Economics
Department, Tackling income inequality: The role of taxes and transfers [2012] 1 OECD J
Econ Stud 37 [OECD, Tackling income inequality].
20. McKinsey & Company, Women Matter: Gender Diversity, a Corporate Performance Driver
(Paris: McKinsey & Company, 2007) at 12-14; Catalyst, The Bottom Line: Connecting
Corporate Performance and Gender Diversity (New York: Catalyst, 2004).
21. Mark Smith & Francesca Bettio, Analysis Note: the Economic Case for Gender Equality
(Bonn, Germany: Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini, 2008) at 9, 10, 17-19; World Bank,
Gender Equality and Development (Washington: World Bank, 2012); United Nations
Children’s Fund, The State of the World’s Children 2007: Women and Children: The Double
Dividend of Gender Equality (New York: United Nations, 2007); Rosella Melanson,
“Combler l’écart salarial entre les homes et les femmes: les avantages pour le trésor public”
(2010) 22:1 CJWL 13.
22. Canadian Index of Wellbeing, How are Canadians Really Doing? The 2012 CIW Report
(Waterloo, Ont: 2012), 42-44, 51-60.
23. OECD, Divided We Stand, supra note 16 at 53.
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global crisis continue to falter, substantive gender equality is now recognized as
essential to economic durability.24
While the need for gender impact analysis of government policies and laws
has been increasingly recognized, very little gender impact analysis—fiscal or
general—is actually being done by governments and many governments that
have initiated gender budgeting have since backed off.25 In Canada, even though
the federal government played an international and national leadership role in
developing gender-based analysis, no Canadian government has yet carried out
the type of comprehensive gender impact analysis of fiscal issues called for in
the Beijing Platform. Instead, most governments continue to leave the pervasive
gender impact of structural and specific changes in tax laws unexamined while
increasingly reverting to ideologies of fiscal coverture to ‘contain costs’ and
‘benefit families.’
Not surprisingly, after decades of political focus on deficit reduction,
detaxation, privatization, globalization, “crisis stimulus” and recovery, and GDP
growth—and after nearly two decades of ignoring gender impact requirements in
policy formation, neither women’s equality in general nor issues of fiscal equality
appear to remain on the policy agenda. And growing inequalities are catching up
with women. More women today are in paid work, but they are working longer
hours in more precarious employment conditions for the same shares of market
incomes that women received over a decade ago. Women’s shares of income by
educational attainment have fallen dramatically, some below previously recorded
levels. Women have been systemically excluded from crisis recovery and stimulus
programs designed to stimulate employment in male-dominated industries,
while public services and women’s employment sectors are targets of ongoing
spending cuts. Young women face higher education debts, longer payback times,
and reduced retirement funding compared with young women of a decade ago
and with young men of today. All women’s health programs federally funded have
been closed. Canada still leaves the costs of caregiving “to be borne by women, by
and large, who provide these services unpaid in their own homes.”26

24. OECD, Gender Initiative, Closing the Gender Gap: Act Now (2012) at 18, 24; Canada,
Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Fiscal Sustainability Report (Ottawa: Office of the
Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2010) at 7-10.
25. Mara Kuhl, Are the Economic Stimulus Programmes Fair for Everyone? A Budget-oriented
Gender Analysis of Economic Stimulus Packages I and II (Bonn, Germany: Friedrich-EbertStiftung, 2010); Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of
Canada to the House of Commons (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 2009) ch 1.
26. Brooks, “social legacy,” supra note 3.
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No policy measure can ever be completely gender neutral. Thus, every fiscal
item will have a unique gender footprint. But overall, the major tax changes
over the last decade in Canada have been markedly gender regressive, giving
larger shares of tax benefits and cuts to men, and smaller shares to women.27
As these changes have taken place, international experts have agreed that all
the components of Canada’s fiscal system—including tax rates, tax bases, tax
expenditures, benefit rates, benefit clawbacks, and tax cuts—are implicated in the
rapidly rising levels of income inequality in Canada.28 However, none has looked
closely at how the whole range of tax and transfer measures affects women as a
class.29 This paper discusses how three types of major and recent tax changes—
i.e., structural detaxation, tax expenditures, and joint tax/benefit measures—all
concentrate after-tax incomes in the hands of those with larger shares of incomes
and assets, and thus in the hands of men, and deserve priority attention.

I. STRUCTURAL DETAXATION
Since the mid-1990s, Canada has pursued austerity and deficit-reduction policies
to deal with revenue shortfalls caused by recurring recessions and the desire for
increased economic growth. Structural detaxation was initiated in the late 1990s
with Canada’s “Tax Advantage” program and accelerated significantly in 2006.
Since then, the Conservative government has implemented major cuts to the
three basic sources of federal revenue: the personal and corporate income taxes
and the goods and services tax.
Detaxation has much in common with tax expenditures, including limited
budgetary visibility, inequitable distribution, high costs, and lack of rational
justification.30 “Detaxation” is used here to refer to systemic tax changes that
remove or significantly reduce taxes imposed on broad categories of transactions,
have more diffuse policy purposes than specific tax expenditures, and are very

27. See generally Kathleen A Lahey, “Women, Substantive Equality, and Fiscal Policy: GenderBased Analysis of Taxes, Benefits, and Budgets” (2010) 22:1 CJWL 29 at 74-82 [Lahey,
“Women and Budgets”].
28. OECD, Country Note: Canada, supra note 16.
29. For example, the detailed examination of the redistributive effects of tax and transfer items
published by the OECD is completely non-gendered, and the scope of transfers include
some capital subsidies but exclude transfers that take place outside households. OECD,
Tackling income inequality, supra note 19.
30. Neil Brooks, “The Tax Expenditure Concept” (1979) 1:1 Can Tax’n 31.
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costly in terms of foregone revenues.31 The term has also been used to refer to
broad tax cuts that create increased opportunities for tax-minimizing conduct or
that increase after-tax rewards without requiring changes in behaviour.32
The components of Canada’s detaxation program were announced before
the 2008 recession began. Originally characterized as growth-enhancing tax cuts,
they were quickly repackaged as “crisis stimulus” policies when the government
was pressured to take anti-recession steps. The first detaxation cuts in 2007/2008
were funded by offsetting them against $38 billion in operating surpluses
inherited from the previous government. Thereafter, however, these tax cuts
removed at least $130.5 billion from total annual federal revenues and produced
total operating deficits of $115.8 billion.33
TABLE 1: CUMULATIVE FEDERAL DETAXATION LOSSES BY GENDER, 2008–2012
Total amounts of detaxation

Women’s shares of
detaxation cuts

GST rate cuts

$48.4 billion

38%

Corporate income tax cuts

$30.4 billion

10–37%

Personal income tax cuts

$51.6 billion

40%

Total revenue losses

$130.4 billion

32–38.6%

Total annual budgetary
deficits, 2008–2012

$115.8 billion

Type of tax

31. Kathleen A Lahey, Canada’s Gendered Budget 2012: Impact of Bills C-38 and C-45 on
Women (Kingston, Ont: Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, 2012) at 125-26 [Lahey,
Gendered Budget].
32. Ali Abidar & Ahmed Laytimi, National Agriculture Policy–Morocco (Meknès, Morocco:
December, 2005); Pierre Cahuc & Stéphane Carcillo, “The Detaxation of Overtime
Hours: Lessons from the French Experiment” (Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study
of Labor, January 2011), online: <ftp.iza.org/dp5439.pdf>; Cf. Magoroh Maruyama,
“New mindscapes for future business policy and management” (1982) 21:1 Technological
Forecasting & Soc Change 53 at 58 (classifying detaxation, along with deregulation, as
“passive” incentives that will mainly incentivize well-established businesses to continue their
present activities and contrasting detaxation with active incentives, which tend to incite
diversification and innovation, and morphogenetic incentives, which facilitate cross-industry
interaction and synergies).
33. House of Commons, Minister of Finance, Canada’s Economic Action Plan: Budget 2009
(January 2009) at 255 [Minister of Finance, Budget 2009].
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As can be seen from Table 1, the tax benefits of these detaxation cuts did
not go equally to women and men. Instead, they shifted public fiscal space from
the federal government to private individuals in proportion to the amounts that
those individuals had contributed monetarily to public revenues. In essence,
this fiscal space was privatized by redistributing it from the federal government
back to individuals based on their individual income-earning capacities and not
equally to all adult members of the population or on the basis of need.
Because these detaxation losses are structural, they will continue to reduce
federal taxes by similar amounts on an annual basis in every year going forward
and always in proportion to individual income-earning capacities over time
as opposed to on a per capita basis. Table 2 shows that for 2012/2013 alone,
detaxation left the federal government with $40.1 billion less revenue than it
would have otherwise received, all of which was allocated unequally between
women and men because it was based on the income tax liabilities of each.
TABLE 2: ANNUAL FEDERAL DETAXATION LOSSES BY GENDER,
2012–2013 FISCAL YEAR
Total amounts of detaxation

Women’s shares of
detaxation cuts

GST rate cuts

$13.8 billion

38%

Corporate/business
income tax cuts

$13.3 billion

10–37%

Personal income tax cuts

$13.0 billion

40%

Total revenue losses

$40.1 billion

29–38%

Type of tax

SOURCE: Annual totals and gender shares are based on SPSD/M v 20 estimation, supra note
34, estimated for 2012.

To put these revenue losses into context, $40.1 billion represented 2.8% of
Canada’s projected GDP for 2012/2013. These losses are in addition to those
from earlier cuts between 1995 and 2008 that amounted to another 4% of GDP.34
As an aside, the federal government has recognized that these types of tax cuts
are not particularly effective in stimulating economic growth or productivity.35
34. OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2009, Special Feature: Environmentally Related Taxation
(2010) at 81-82.
35. Minister of Finance, Budget 2009, supra note 33 at 255.
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As these figures demonstrate, each of these structural tax cuts is gender
regressive. With 60% of the financial benefit of the personal income tax cuts
going to men, and men’s shares of corporate and GST cuts ranging from 62%
to 90%, it is numerically impossible for these tax cuts to help increase women’s
shares of total consumable incomes above their existing 38% to 40% shares.
In fact, it is much more likely that, over time, detaxation will place increased
downward pressure on women’s existing shares of after-tax incomes.
Two factors make structural detaxation gender regressive. The first is that
women hold persistently small shares of incomes and assets, which form the
benefit bases on which these detaxation cuts have been allocated. Thus, these
tax cuts go to those with the largest incomes and the most wealth. The second
is that the cuts will be regressive in incidence to the extent that the rates being
cut were originally progressive in incidence. When making these cuts, the federal
government contended that they were gender-neutral because they were merely
proportionate to women’s and men’s average tax rates. However, this explanation
cannot change the fact that detaxation distributes tax benefits just like other types
of tax expenditure, even though they do not meet Surrey’s narrow definition of tax
expenditures.36 Detaxation may be more diffuse and less specifically targeted or
easily identifiable among the items commonly listed in tax expenditure budgets,
but detaxation transfers massive amounts of economic power to individuals and
corporations, with virtually no criteria, such as need or equity, being applied
to ascertain eligibility to receive these benefits. Detaxation privatizes public
revenues by returning or surrendering the state’s claims on incomes and cash
flows, leaving its fiscal space to selected members of the general population rather
than to everyone on an equitable basis. Pierre Cuhac and Stéphane Carcillo call
these gains “virtual manna” because they fall into the hands of a subset of people
who do nothing to receive them. They thus inspire more efforts to manipulate
the tax characterization of conditions that produce these benefits rather than
heightened economic engagement.37
However characterized, the financial benefits of detaxation have disproportionately gone to men. With 40% of all women having too little income to have
any income tax liability in the first place, and with men owning nearly twice the
incomes and assets that qualify them to receive the benefits of detaxation, women
36. Stanley S Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1973) at 6; Paul R McDaniel & Stanley S Surrey, International
Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A Comparative Study (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer
Law, 1985) at 5.
37. Cuhac & Carcillo, supra note 32 at 8.
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simply do not hold the types of “entry cards” that would enable them to obtain
equal access to detaxation benefits. Giving a personal income tax cut to those who
have little or no income tax liability gives them nothing at all. Similarly, giving
tax cuts to corporations leaves out all those who do not own corporate shares.
Identifying and tracking the gender impact of detaxation is a crucial first
step in “uncovering” women in taxation. The present-day gender distribution of
detaxation benefits is the legacy of women’s historical coverture, which ensured
that women entered into the ages of mercantilism and capitalism with unequal
access to capital, employment, wages, and caregiving services. Abolition of
formal coverture has not erased women’s historical economic inequalities, and
the very slight redistribution of after-tax incomes from men to women produced
by Canada’s present-day total tax structure has not been sufficient to overcome
the huge capital, income, and care-receiving gaps that still characterize women’s
economic existence.
By scaling the financial value of structural detaxation benefits to existing
individual shares of capital, income, and care-receiving, detaxation essentially
sets the slow process of gendered redistribution into reverse. For example, by
reducing the 2012 total federal fiscal space by 2.8%, detaxation thus reduces
the small amount of gender redistribution previously generated by the total
tax-transfer system by 2.8%. Total gendered redistributions have been a mere
4% in the best of recent years.38 Although it might not seem like much, 2.8% of
4% is significant not only because it turns that 4% rate of redistribution into the
smaller figure of 3.888%, but also because that reduced rate of redistribution will
remain in place in every year going forward.
Structural effects are generalizations, and so it is important to emphasize
that each and every component of general rate-based detaxation will have its own
unique gender footprint. I consider two examples here—the regressive effects on
women by income class of the 2% GST rate cut that formed part of the overall
detaxation package, and the “doubled” regression of forcing private individuals
to fund the cost of replacing government benefits and services out of their own
private incomes when detaxation leads to cuts in public services and benefits.
A. GENDER IMPACT: TAX RATE CUTS

Table 3 demonstrates the upside-down effect of the reduction of the GST rate
from 7% to 5% that began in 2006. The gender effects of these cuts are direct
38. In years in which women received 36% of market incomes, they tended to end up with 40%
of after-tax consumable incomes as the result of the redistributive effects mainly of transfer
items. See Lahey, “Women and Budgets,” supra note 27 at 42.
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and permanent. Although individuals with low incomes receive the tax benefit
of refundable GST tax credits, those credits do not offset all lower-income GST
liability. And because women are concentrated in lower income levels, they will
receive fewer financial benefits from detaxation of such consumption taxes even
though such taxes are assessed at a fixed rate across income groups instead of
scaled to taxable income.
TABLE 3: AVERAGE BENEFIT FROM 2% GST CUTS, BY INCOME
QUINTILE AND SEX, 2012
Quintile

First

Second

Third

Fourth

Highest

All

Women

$132

$343

$584

$799

$1,348

38%

Men

$222

$451

$708

$991

$1,666

62%

SOURCE: SPSD/M v 20 estimation, supra note 34.

As can be seen from these figures, those with the lowest incomes—who need
additional government support if such support is being handed out without
regard to cost—receive the smallest benefits from the GST rate cuts, while
those who need support the least receive the most. And even within low-income
groups, women’s average incomes are lower than men’s average incomes. Thus,
women in the first quintile receive annual benefits from GST detaxation of only
$132, while men receive $222. Women have the lowest of the low incomes in
this quintile, but in violation of all concepts of equity, they receive the smallest
detaxation benefits of any group in this table. Maldistributions similarly arise
when cuts are made to income taxes. For example, when $1.9 billion in personal
income tax cuts came into effect in 2009/2010, women received only 36.6% of
those tax benefits. And their shares are unlikely to increase in future years.39
B. THE DOUBLED GENDER IMPACT: SPENDING CUTS

The gender impact of detaxation does not end when revenues are diverted into
private hands. Structural detaxation is designed to impair governmental fiscal
capacities by privatizing potential fiscal space and leaving former tax revenues in
the hands of private individuals and corporations. When government programs
are then defunded as the result of such self-induced loss of fiscal capacity,
detaxation does not just cancel benefits or services; it also shifts the economic

39. SPSD/M v 20 estimation, supra note 34.
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burden to private individuals to fund their own replacements for benefits or
services they had previously received via government programs.
Unlike government services and benefits, which are funded collectively out
of government revenues, individuals have to use their own resources to obtain
replacement services and benefits, if indeed they can actually afford to provide
any such replacements for themselves. Whether such private costs are then
incurred on a one-time basis or over a longer period, “private” self-tax systems
intensify the regressive effects of detaxation because detaxation allocates the costs
of private replacement services and benefits to individuals on the basis of inability
to pay: The less the individual’s ability to pay for private replacement services and
benefits, the fewer replacement services and benefits the individual can obtain.
The lower the individual’s income, the larger the individual’s cost of replacement
expenditures in terms of effective self-tax rates. And for those individuals whose
incomes are too low to afford replacement services or benefits, they will do
without those services or benefits and incur a net loss in wellbeing as a result.
In this way, detaxation undercuts the equity of tax/benefit systems that
originally converted tax revenues into benefits for equitable distribution. This
second-order effect intensifies or “doubles” the negation of equity generated by
detaxation and locks it in for all future years. These regressive effects will continue
until the fiscal space surrendered to the private sector and the former public
services and benefits shifted to the private domain are returned to governments in
some future year—an ending that is in no way guaranteed to future generations.
The “doubled regressivity” of detaxation cuts can be seen by looking at the
gender effects of phasing out the universal and individual age 65/66 Old Age
Security (OAS) allowances, one of the spending cuts announced in 2012 after
years of detaxation cuts were used to justify massive government spending cuts.
This example demonstrates how the shift of financing public benefits to private
individuals is gender regressive (and income regressive). The first stage of the
OAS phase-out is elective, allowing individuals to work past age 65 in exchange
for receiving OAS “bonuses” when they retire. The second stage begins in 2023,
when age 65/66 OAS will be cancelled for everyone. Both sets of changes to the
OAS intensify the regressive effects of detaxation on women, but they do so in
very different ways.
1.

VOLUNTARY DEFERRAL

In the first stage, before 2023, individuals may defer taking OAS pensions
for up to five years in exchange for receiving up to 36% larger OAS pension
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payments after that five-year deferral.40 Women will receive fewer benefits from
the voluntary deferral program because the realities of women’s labour market
positions mean that they have less choice than men to work longer: At least
25% of all workers in their 60s end up taking involuntary retirement due to
unemployment, underemployment, health issues, or heightened care responsibilities, and significantly more women than men end up in this position.41 As a
universal income security program, the Guaranteed Income Security (GIS) part
of the OAS system provides minimum survivable incomes regardless of earnings
histories and also permits recipients to engage in some paid work without losing
benefits. Thus, for women on the economic margins, whether on social assistance
or forced out of liveable earnings, it would be very difficult or even legally
impossible to refuse to begin receiving OAS/GIS at age 65.
Given these circumstances, more women than men will need access to OAS
as soon as possible and so will be excluded from the new “bonus” deferral system
because of labour market and gender realities. For women in this position, their
small detaxation gains will be quite insignificant and will not make up for being
excluded from the maximum 36% enhancement of deferred OAS pensions.
The doubled regression in their situation thus consists of receiving the smallest
detaxation benefits plus being structurally shut out of the OAS deferral bonus.
In contrast, men are more likely to be able to continue working up to age
70, and large numbers of them will receive incomes between ages 65 and 70 that
are so high that even if they elect to begin receiving OAS at age 65, those benefits
will be substantially clawed back. Thus, men are more likely to forego OAS until
age 67 or later, not in response to an incentive to increase future benefits, but
simply because they would receive no or minimal benefits from receiving OAS
anyway.42 In other words, the OAS deferral benefit represents “manna” to those
it will benefit and is not actually providing any incentive to remain in paid work
longer in order to obtain larger future OAS payments; remaining in paid work
at average male wages is the incentive most likely to operate in that context. For
men in this situation, this will be “double manna” because they receive the largest
shares of benefits flowing from detaxation tax cuts, and they will also benefit
from the 36% OAS bonus when deferring OAS until age 70.
40. House of Commons, Minister of Finance, Jobs Growth and Long-Term Prosperity: Economic
Action Plan 2012 (March 2012) at 198-99 [Minister of Finance, Economic Action Plan 2012].
41. Yves Carrier & Diane Galameau, “How Many Years to Retirement?” in Statistics Canada,
Insights on Canadian Society (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2012) 1 at 2.
42. For illustrations of these types of scenarios, see Service Canada, “Deferring your Old Age
Security Pension” (September 2013), online: <www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/
pensions/oas/changes/deferral.shtml>.
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2.

CANCELLATION OF AGE 65/66 OAS

In the second stage, OAS (and the GIS income support component) will be
phased out beginning in 2013 for claimants aged 65 and 66. This phase-out
will begin with individuals who were between ages 48 and 54 in 2012, and at
the end of the phase-out, those under age 48 in 2012 will receive no OAS/GIS
until age 67.43 The long implementation period is said to enable people to save
replacement income for former age 65/66 OAS pensions.
Cancelling age 65/66 OAS beginning in 2023 will be gender regressive for
women for two reasons. First, OAS pensions are universal, gender-neutral income
security measures. Regardless of earnings histories, both women and men receive
the same amounts of OAS at the same ages, and these pensions are not adjusted
by marital status. (Note, however, that the GIS benefit is joint and is adjusted
to reflect relationship status.) As such, OAS pensions are progressively redistributive from high-income to low-income and from male to female individuals.
Cancelling two such benefit years removes a major source of progressive redistribution from the total tax-transfer system and replaces it with private incomes,
which are distributed regressively by economic condition, sex, and age.
Second, because existing gender income gaps have changed very little over
the last two decades, it is likely that they will remain in place until 2023 and
beyond. This is significant because, on average, women’s peak earning years arrive
earlier in life than men’s, and even women’s peak incomes are much lower than
men’s average incomes throughout women’s prime working years. Once women’s
peak earning years pass, and the closer women are to retirement, the lower
women’s incomes are, relative to men’s. The women who will first face reduced
and then cancelled age 65/66 OAS pensions are among the same generations of
women who will have carried more educational debt than male students, taken
longer to pay it off than men, possessed less financial capacity for lifetime asset
accumulation than their male cohorts, faced growing income gaps compared
with men with equal educations, experienced less access to pension plans and
pension benefits than men, and balanced paid work with heavier caregiving and
other unpaid work responsibilities than men throughout their lives.44
These two factors alone—loss of a gender-equal universal pension and the
statistical persistence of age 65/66 gender income gaps—mean that the cancellation of age 65/66 OAS will be significantly gender regressive.

43. Minister of Finance, Economic Action Plan 2012, supra note 41 at 197.
44. Lahey, Gendered Budget, supra note 31 at 179-84.
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There is more: Any attempts to replace the lost age 65/66 OAS pension
amounts through private savings will intensify that gender regressivity. Despite
the obvious gender disadvantages of these OAS/GIS cuts, the federal government
expects individuals who will lose access to age 65/66 OAS pensions to set up
their own “private” self-funded “tax” systems through individual private savings
in order to fund private replacements for OAS pensions lost in those two years.
In effect, they are expected, in the best-case scenarios, to save what they can
of their annual detaxation benefits to make up for the prospective loss of age
65/66 OAS pensions.
As demonstrated in Table 4, these self-assessed “private OAS replacement
taxes” will be gender regressive. Women’s lifelong lower incomes mean that they
will have to set aside 43% to 70% more of their incomes each year than men their
age in order to be able to accumulate savings that will replace the amounts they
would have received from OAS during ages 65 and 66. These gender gaps are all
regressive not only by gender but also by age.
TABLE 4: AGE 65/66 OAS “REPLACEMENT TAX” AS PERCENTAGE OF INCOME BY
AGE AND SEX, 2012
Lost OAS
(age
65/66)

Annual
Registered
Retirement
Savings Plan
contribution

Women

Men

Women

Men

30

$27,398

$532.47

$37,057

$51,632

1.44%

1.03%

40

$21,816

$661.00

$39,944

$59,959

1.66%

1.10%

50

$17,405

$967.53

$42,637

$72,200

2.29%

1.35%

60

-0-

-0-

$28,569

$66,630

-0-

-0-

Age in
2012

Average
2012 income

Registered Retirement
Savings Plan deposit
as % of income

SOURCE: Lahey, Gendered Budget 2012, supra note 31 at 101, citing Jim Stanford, “How
Much Will YOU Lose from OAS Deferral??” (30 March 2012) Progressive Economics Forum,
online: <www.progressive-economics.ca/2012/03/30/how-much-will-you-lose-fromoas-deferral>.

Gender and age regressivity intersect in setting the rates for this private OAS
replacement tax because both women and men will lose the same amounts of
OAS depending on their ages in 2023. But women have lower average incomes
than men at every age, and those income gaps widen with increasing age. Thus,
women who were age 30 in 2012 will lose the same dollar amount of OAS at age
65 as men who were age 30 in 2012 ($27,398). If both men and women began
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their private OAS replacement self-tax in 2012, women age 30 would have had to
make Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) deposits representing 1.44%
of their 2012 incomes in order to accumulate savings of $27,398 by age 65 (the
estimated amount they would save to replace their age 65/66 OAS). Men age 30
would only have had to make RRSP deposits representing 1.03% of their average
incomes to reach the same target. These “private tax rate” gender gaps increase
with age, more than doubling for women who were age 50 in 2012.
Because these “private” self-defined tax systems will be embedded in gendered
market relations, these private OAS replacement tax rates will be allocated on the
basis of inability to pay, not on the basis of ability to pay. The greater the disparity
between women’s and men’s incomes, the larger the percentage of annual income
women will have to “tax” themselves to be able to replace their lost age 65/66
OAS benefits. Thus these private replacement taxes will be inequitable.
There are further negative effects for women. The annual costs of those
self-imposed private taxes are likely to exceed the amounts of tax savings that
many women will derive from detaxation between 2012 and 2023. So while men
receive detaxation “manna” during their working lives, women face higher private
replacement taxes to obtain the benefits they would previously have received in
exchange for their earlier tax payments. This runs completely counter to the
redistributive objectives of the OAS system.
This policy change keeps on giving more forms of “manna” to those with
high incomes. The growing use of pension income splitting and Tax Free Savings
Accounts (TFSAs) to expand the income ranges of eligibility for both GIS and
OAS means that at the same time that women are disproportionately burdened
by the OAS cuts, higher-income spouses or cohabitants will be able to use
pension splitting and TFSAs to claim larger shares of OAS and GIS benefits.
Both TFSAs and pension income splitting expand OAS/GIS clawback zones,
create income-splitting opportunities that take advantage of ideologies of fiscal
coverture, and benefit men more than women. The Chief Actuary for OAS has
estimated that by 2023, when the OAS cuts become involuntary, the costs of
government spending on just the GIS component of the OAS system will have
already increased by some $4.2 billion because of TFSAs, an increase of 12%.45 In
2012 alone, high-income spouses received an extra $249.4 million in OAS and
$7.3 million in GIS due to pension income splitting, which artificially impoverishes high-income spouses to create eligibility for those benefits.46
45. Canada, Office of the Chief Actuary: Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
Canada, Actuarial Report (9th) on the Old Age Security Program, as at 31 December 2009
(Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2011) at 10, 11, 84.
46. Lahey, Gendered Budget, supra note 31 at 81.
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Detaxation does not operate in isolation from other policies or from economic
realities. By its very nature, detaxation turns revenue systems upside down and
inside out: It turns cuts to progressive tax rates into regressive tax benefits; it
intensifies pre-existing regressivities; and it turns existing economic and social
hierarchies into traps that grip ever more tightly as surrender of governmental
fiscal space leaves markets with increased authority over income distribution
and quality of life from the day individuals enter into market relations until
their lives end.

II. TAX EXPENDITURES
Tax expenditures represent a second complex set of fiscal measures that deeply
embed gender bias in the revenue and operating functions of governance. In
2010, they removed nearly as much potential revenue from the federal treasury
as was actually collected: The combined total of all personal, corporate, and GST
tax expenditures came to $172.0 billion in a year in which total federal revenues
collected were only $191.5 billion.47 These $172 billion represented 47% of
potential revenue for the year, all of which was surrendered to the private sector
through hundreds of tax exemptions, allowances, deductions, credits, deferrals,
and special rates.
Like detaxation, the distribution of tax expenditures reflects gendered
economic inequalities originally shaped by civil coverture and now replicated
whenever these tax benefits are built into or made contingent upon existing
allocations of capital, incomes, and caregiving. Despite the large amounts of
potential revenue left in private hands as the result of tax expenditures, it is
arithmetically impossible for tax expenditures as they are presently structured
to help close the gender gap between men’s 60% shares of after-tax incomes and
women’s 40% shares.
Like detaxation benefits, tax expenditures are distributed on an “upside
down” basis; specific tax expenditures will provide larger financial benefits for
taxpayers with high incomes than they will for those with low incomes. Some
technical variations produce more extreme maldistributions than others. For
example, tax credits produce the same dollar value of benefits for taxpayers at
all income levels, but they do not benefit those with no incomes or too little
income to take full advantage of them. Even fully refundable credits only reach
those affected by the formal tax system, and they thus exclude many with status
47. Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2011 (Ottawa: Public
Works Canada, 2012).

LAHEY, UNCOVERING WOMEN IN TAXATION 447

under the Indian Act48 and those who have no contact with the formal tax system.
Universal benefits are distributionally far more income and gender neutral; but,
as pointed out above, even the distribution of benefits like OAS/GIS can be
skewed by the operation of income tax expenditures like income splitting.
Given the lifelong gaps between women’s and men’s incomes, it is no surprise
that men receive 62% of total deductions taken in calculating total income
assessed, and that the rest of the total tax calculation process only shifts another
2% of total after-tax income from men to women. Table 5 shows women’s total
shares of tax expenditures in 2010.
TABLE 5: TAX FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES BY GENDER, 2010
Total amount of
tax expenditures

Women’s shares of
tax expenditures

Personal income
tax rate cuts

$128.6 billion

40%

Corporate income tax

$26.0 billion

30%

GST

$17.4 billion

38%

Total revenue losses

$172.0 billion

38%

Type of tax

SOURCE: Canada Revenue Agency, Preliminary Statistics (Ottawa: Canada Revenue
Agency, 2012) Table 4.

A. IMPACT ON UNDERLYING GENDER STRUCTURES

The above gender shares of broad categories of tax expenditures reported in Table
5 do not fully reveal the expenditures’ incentivizing effects. Providing a comprehensive picture of the actual gender impact of specific tax expenditures is quite
complex because this analysis depends on identifying the policy purposes of each
provision, the technical way in which it is structured, and the type of tax law in
which it is located. However, it is useful to consider three groups of tax expenditures associated with three fundamental inputs into economic production:
capital, paid work, and caregiving. Table 6 sets out the amounts of the largest tax
expenditures associated with each of these basic economic components together
with the gender shares received by women and men in 2012.49

48. RSC 1985, c I-5.
49. These results were simulated. See SPSD/M v 20 estimation, supra note 34.
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TABLE 6: FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES: CAPITAL, CAREGIVING, AND
EMPLOYMENT BY GENDER, 2012
Tax expenditures
by subject matter

Total cost in
foregone revenue

Men’s shares

Women’s shares

Dividend tax credit

$6.5 billion

71.2%

29.8%

Capital
gains 50% exemption

$4.2 billion

78.2%

21.8%

Pension
income splitting

$2.0 billion

220.6%

120.6%

Total

$12.7 billion

96.5%

3.5%

Canada
child tax benefit

$9.2 billion

3.7%

96.2%

Dependent
spouse credit

$1.7 billion

84.1%

15.9%

Transfer of other
credits to spouse

$0.6 billion

84.0%

16.0%

Equivalent to
married credit
(single parent credit)

$0.6 billion

25.9%

74.1%

Dependent
caregiver credit

$0.1 billion

60.6%

39.4%

Total

$12.2 billion

20.6%

79.4%

CPP/QPP
contribution credit

$3.8 billion

60.2%

39.8%

Employment credit

$2.2 billion

55.4%

44.6%

EI contribution credit

$1.3 billion

58.3%

41.7%

Working
income tax credit

$1.3 billion

47.4%

52.6%

$8.6 billion

65.8%

34.2%

$ 33.5 billion

61%

39%

Capital:

Caregiving:

Employment:

Total
Total all categories

SOURCE: These results were simulated using SPSD/M v 20 estimation, supra note 34.
NOTE: Pension income splitting benefits are treated as additions to existing accumulations
of personal wealth, even though those tax benefits are received annually along with annual
pension benefits.
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What is striking about these figures is that the total revenue foregone for just
three of the largest tax subsidies to capital top the list with a total cost of $12.7
billion for 2012, and the top four subsidies for caregiving come close at a cost of
$12.2 billion.50 The gender disparities are also more pronounced in both those
categories than in the third category, subsidies for employment.
These three categories of tax expenditures are merely suggestive of how
underlying gender hierarchies continue to shape men’s and women’s relationships
to basic factors of economic production, and are by no means comprehensive.
Indeed, it could be argued that the employment subsidies listed here do not even
form a legitimate independent category because each of those items ultimately
benefits owners of capital who employ workers and who would otherwise
perhaps have to find other ways to provide greater income, unemployment, and
retirement security for workers, as well as higher wages at the bottom end and
some compensation for employment-related expenses. That view suggests that
nearly two-thirds of these large tax subsidies are all aimed at promoting capital
formation, and with the exception of the Working Income Tax Benefit (WITB),
the majority of those subsidies go to men, ranging from 220% of income splitting
tax benefits to just 55% of employment tax credits.
The caregiving subsidies listed above do not reveal the whole structure of
women’s unpaid work lives, but they do reveal that Canadian governments are
willing to use tax laws to reinforce women’s responsibilities for caregiving as
an essential input into the physical and social reproduction of human labour,
regardless of whether women are single or coupled. Subsidies to private patriarchal
relations are revealed in substantial subsidies to high-income spouses/partners for
supporting an economically dependent spouse who will presumably care for the
supporting spouse, other members of the household, and the home itself. Much
smaller subsidies of the same type are also available to single parents who support
economically dependent children. But the fact that single parenting is essentially
a form of public patriarchal relations is revealed in both the very large subsidy to
parents—$9.2 billion in 2012, the largest of all the subsidies in any category—
and the very large allocation of this subsidy to women—96.2%.
The gender patterns in these tax expenditures suggest, then, that it is well
worthwhile for the Canadian state to subsidize women’s caregiving roles whether
they are essentially performing them for the direct benefit of spouses/partners or
whether they are doing so as a public service in exchange for the Canada Child
50. The caregiving figure would be $14.9 billion if the Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB),
$2.7 billion for 2012, were included. Women received an estimated 80.1% of that direct
expenditure in 2012.
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Tax Benefit (CCTB) (and the Universal Child Care Benefit, UCCB). The fact
that these large expenditures are aimed at supporting individual women who
do care work in their own households (in addition to the UCCB), rather than
providing universally accessible public care resources of all kinds, suggests that,
at the very least, there is little concern that public subsidies for private caregiving
activities inevitably hinder caregivers from devoting more time to the types of
economic activities that would give them access to larger shares of capital and
employment subsidies.
B. BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EQUALITY

In the aggregate, tax expenditures form a very durable system of subsidies that
provide incentives to maintain gendered allocations of incomes, and, through
their very number, help insulate those allocations from quick change. As can
be seen from the lists of tax expenditures in Part III(A), above, not even the
very large amount of revenue left in women’s hands through the CCTB—$9.2
billion in 2010—can offset the even larger allocations of tax expenditures that go
predominantly to men.
In short, no tax expenditures are large enough to close existing gender
income gaps. Large subsidies for women’s care relations ensure that women
still perform substantial unpaid work in their homes. They also ensure that the
very process of devoting substantial time to unpaid care work reduces the time
caregivers—mainly women—have available for paid work. Thus, larger care
subsidies will always tend to “crowd out” women’s energies and time for paid
work.51 As women seek to gain equal access to capital incomes and employment
incomes, the fact that leaving unpaid work behind them would cost their spouses/
partners substantial tax benefits exerts pressure on women to treat paid work as a
secondary responsibility.
Even if women can achieve parity with men in allocations of employmentrelated tax subsidies, parity in relation to subsidies for capital and corporate
investments will be much more difficult to attain. Men receive 70% of creditable
corporate dividends and 91% of reported capital gains exemptions. Each of
these figures bespeaks high levels of male capital and corporate ownership. Even
men’s shares of those tax expenditures are not distributed equally among men.
For example, taxpayers in the richest decile received 91% of all capital gains
exemptions in 2012, and 82% of taxpayers in that decile were men. It will take a
very long time for women to achieve equal shares of wealth at all income levels,
51. Decima Research, National Profile of Family Caregivers in Canada–2002: Final Report
(Ottawa: Health Canada, 2002) at 6-7, 33-34.
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and existing gender allocations of capital subsidies to men reinforce the barriers
to that aspect of economic equality. The long history of civil coverture left women
well behind men in terms of ownership and control of the means of economic
production, as well as continuing to burden them with disproportionate responsibilities for social (re)production.

III. THE JOINT TAX/BENEFIT SYSTEM
Women’s movement towards economic equality is further impeded by the large
and growing use of joint tax and expenditure provisions or fiscal coverture.
Unlike civil coverture, the legacy of which remains most visible in lopsided
gender shares of capital, paid work, and unpaid work, fiscal coverture has never
been abolished, and, in Canada, is used extensively in tax and expenditure
provisions of all types. Indeed, in the last quarter century, as women’s equality
rights have been increasingly recognized in constitutional and international law,
the use of policies expressing the values of fiscal coverture has been increasing at
an accelerating pace.
On paper, the federal Income Tax Act52 (ITA) makes it sound as if each
individual is a taxpayer. However, there has always been strong pressure on
the government to adopt the married couple—and more recently, unmarried
common law couples of both opposite and same sexes—as tax and benefit units.
The government has not done this by passing laws that redefine the legal tax
unit as the couple or by enacting full joint filing of all taxable incomes, as in
the United States, but by slowly and steadily inserting growing numbers of
“joint” tax benefit, tax penalty, program benefit, and benefit clawback laws into
federal legislation. The provinces and territories have tended to follow the federal
lead, which means that provincial and territorial governments have adopted
similar types of laws.
As a result, Canadian tax law is riddled with well over a hundred different
tax provisions that treat spouses or common law couples as presumptively
interdependent and financially integrated tax units. These provisions are neither
consistent in application nor fair in impact. For example, taxpayers have the right
to transfer taxable dividends to a supporting spouse to optimize the tax benefits
of the dependant spouse income tax credit, but transferring the same taxable
dividends to a low-income spouse could disqualify that spouse/partner from
receiving the WITB. At the same time, the recent enactment of pension income
52. RSC 1985, c 1.
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splitting laws has made it possible for high-income spouses/partners to obtain not
just additional OAS/GIS pensions and benefits, but also additional refundable
GST credits, UCCB, and other low-income supports when their split incomes
are treated as their real incomes for the purposes of qualifying for such measures.
When joint tax/benefit provisions come under discussion, political positions
are highly polarized and tend to focus on one specific measure at a time, such as
the dependant spouse credit, the Canada Child Tax Benefit clawback, or pension
income splitting. In these discussions, proponents rely on the assumed economic
unity of adult couples to justify these provisions, while opponents emphasize how
joint measures undercut women’s economic autonomy by subsidizing women’s
unpaid work in the home and creating new fiscal barriers to women’s paid work.
Advocates of joint tax and benefit provisions essentially argue for the legitimacy
of fiscal coverture, while those seeking individual taxation and benefit systems
insist that joint fiscal instruments are inconsistent with democratic principles of
sex equality, equality of opportunity, and equity.53
Joint fiscal measures are invariably treated as creating either/or choices
between competing lifestyles. The face-off is usually framed as contrasting the
income tax load on single-income couples who can or would like to live on
one high income and that of two-income couples, most of which cannot take
advantage of joint fiscal measures by virtue of status or types and amounts of
incomes.54 Single individuals are virtually erased from the discussion because they
are presumed to fall outside the scope of policy concerns, such as reproductive
rates, “choice” for couples as to care arrangements (in home or out of home
and publicly or privately funded), or the costs of raising children. Low-income
individuals and couples are often left out of such discussions completely, either
because it is assumed that joint penalty provisions that reduce low-income
supports due to partner incomes are justified (fiscal coverture) or because it is
understood that low-income people will have too little income to benefit from
joint tax measures anyway.
In these debates, governments are usually assumed to be neutral arbiters of
equity and the common good. But in fact, as Canadian joint fiscal measures
are structured, their most important function is as powerful cost-control tools
designed to shift large amounts of economic power from low- and moderateincome women to governments in the name of “target efficiency,” while at

53. Lahey, Benefit/Penalty Unit, supra note 8 at 39-72.
54. See generally Richard Krever & John Head, Tax Units and the Tax Rate Scale (Melbourne:
Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1996).

LAHEY, UNCOVERING WOMEN IN TAXATION 453

the same time offering large tax subsidies to high-income supporting spouses/
partners to create the illusion that joint fiscal policies are a boon to all couples.
This can be seen clearly when the annual revenues and outlays from Canada’s
joint fiscal system are conceptualized as a three-way flow involving two spouses/
partners and governments that have implemented joint fiscal measures. In
Figure 1, tax effects and benefit clawback/extension effects have been aggregated
across all policy categories and across all levels of government to demonstrate
what happens in Canada when federal and provincial governments get between
spouses and partners.
FIGURE 1: JOINT TAX/BENEFIT GAINS AND LOSSES, 2012 (BILLION DOLLARS)
Government: +$18.3 billion
Men:
Women:
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Clearly, women lose a great deal from Canada’s joint fiscal system. As shown
in Table 7, in 2012, joint tax and spending provisions at all levels of government
cost married/cohabiting women a total of $25.8 billion in consumable incomes
(including after GST and other commodity taxes are paid on consumption) or
an average of $3,182 per woman affected. What is striking about these figures,

454

(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

however, is that governments benefit far more than spouses/cohabitants do from
these massive joint tax-transfer losses. Governments received $18.3 billion of
women’s total losses and only passed $7.5 billion of women’s total losses on to
men, at an average of $920 per man.
TABLE 7: JOINT TAX/BENEFIT GAINS AND LOSSES AMONG WOMEN, MEN, AND
GOVERNMENTS, 2012

Men

Women

Net effect on
total federal
and provincial
fiscal balances

Taxes payable

($8.4 billion)

$2.9 billion

($5.5 billion)

Transfer payments

($0.9 billion)

($22.9 billion)

$23.8 billion

Net fiscal balances

$7.5 billion

($25.8 billion)

$18.3 billion

Item

SOURCE: All the figures cited in this discussion as well as the three-way allocations of costs and
benefits of joint fiscal instruments were estimated using SPSD/M v 20. See supra note 34.

Looking at the after-tax effects of Canada’s total joint fiscal system in this way
reveals two important facts. First, the biggest “winners” in this three-way relationship will always be the governments that operate these systems. That is because
the main justification in Canada for using joint fiscal instruments—regardless of
whether they are set up in the form of tax expenditures and direct benefits, or as
tax penalties and benefit clawbacks—is “target efficiency” in providing income
support only to those who really “need” it.
Second, men in general, and particularly those with low and moderate
incomes, also lose a great deal from this set of “targeted” low-income supports.
Because the fiction of fiscal coverture still casts men in the role of main
breadwinner, the presence of a conjugal partner is considered to be sufficient
grounds for using income-tested benefit caps to withdraw government benefits
from those receiving low-income transfers. In modern gender- and sexualityneutral terms, fiscal coverture ensures that when individuals with incomes live
with spouses/cohabitants who would otherwise qualify for low-income supports,
they are deemed to share their incomes in ways that justify replacing government
benefits with the second adult’s private earnings. Through this mechanism, couples
of all types are being forced to adhere to the male breadwinner model simply by
assuming that all lower-income individuals—who are predominantly women—
are economically dependent on their partners, whether they have chosen that
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financial arrangement or not. The CCTB, which is an income-tested refundable
tax credit for lower income couples and women, does account for roughly a third
of the $22.9 billion that women lost through this joint fiscal system in 2012, but
there are many other provisions in every jurisdiction in Canada that replicate
this result every year. These income-targeted low-income supports ensure that
the presumptions and expectations of fiscal coverture continue to shape the
economic lives of both women and men in the low- and modest-income levels,
regardless of what they might choose for themselves.
At the higher income ranges, however, joint tax-transfer rules produce
the opposite result. When two spouses/cohabitants are in different income tax
brackets, joint tax provisions like pension income splitting not only transfer tax
liability to the lower income partner but also can actually increase the higherincome partner’s eligibility for low-income reliefs. This occurs because income
splitting artificially “impoverishes” the partner with the higher income, as
discussed earlier in this article.
Governments may find it convenient to make the case for joint tax and benefit
laws in vague terms of “helping single-income parents” or “creating choice,”
but, in fact, joint fiscal laws increase “choices”—and disposable incomes—only
for those who actually start out with the very highest incomes. Everyone else
receives less choice—and less money—as a result of Canada’s many joint tax
and benefit provisions. Table 8 demonstrates how eliminating all joint tax and
transfer measures (fiscally “unmarrying” all spouses/cohabitants) would change
disposable incomes for women as compared with men. The positive amounts
represent increases in disposable incomes, and the negative amounts indicate
reductions in disposable incomes.
As Table 8 demonstrates, women lost an average of $3,182 per year (2012)
in disposable income as the result of the many joint tax and transfer provisions
in federal and provincial systems.55 These losses are largest at the lowest income
levels, which is why these losses so quickly amount to a total of nearly $26 billion
net per year for women in the aggregate (2012).
55. Table 8 reports net effects of all joint tax and expenditure on average disposable incomes
(before payment of consumption or commodity taxes) instead of net effects on consumable
incomes (after payment of commodity taxes). This was done for two reasons: shifting
disposable income from higher-income individuals to lower-income individuals will not
necessarily shift higher-income consumption practices to those with lower incomes, and there
is some suggestion that women’s consumption choices are different than men’s, particularly
if there are children in the household. See e.g. Shelley A Phipps & Peter S Burton, “What’s
Mine is Yours? The Influence of Male and Female Incomes on Patterns of Household
Expenditure” (1998) 65:260 Economica 599.
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TABLE 8: EFFECT OF FISCAL INDIVIDUALIZATION ON DISPOSABLE INCOMES,
BY SEX AND DECILE, 2012
Number of individuals

Change in total disposable
income ($ million)

Change in average
disposable income ($)

Decile

Male

Female

Male

Female

Both

Male

Female

Both

1

523

1263

75

3774

3850

147

2989

2168

2

478

1298

439

5766

6206

919

4441

3493

3

660

1119

784

4034

4819

1189

3606

2609

4

740

1036

101

3723

3622

137

3594

2040

5

858

920

552

3400

2848

644

3696

1602

6

975

802

861

2752

1892

883

3431

1065

7

1007

767

1377

1874

497

1368

2443

280

8

1120

660

1925

1344

570

1719

2052

320

9

1178

598

2004

1185

819

1701

1980

461

10

1384

394

2683

318

2364

1938

808

1330

Total

8923

8857

8205

28182

19978

920

3182

1124

SOURCE: SPSD/M v 20 estimate, supra note 34.
NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

If all joint provisions were repealed, then women in the lowest income deciles
would have $3,000 to $4,440 more in annual after-tax disposable incomes, and
even women in the top income deciles would see nearly $1,000 to $2,000 net
increases. Although there are far fewer men in low-income deciles, these men
would also see increases in disposable incomes under a purely individualized tax
system. However, men in middle- and high-income deciles would experience
a reduction in disposable incomes as they lose the many benefits of the very
generous joint tax and benefit rules that favour them.
It is also important to note that, overall, complete individualization of
Canada’s total tax-transfer system would also shift disposable incomes from
higher-income couples to lower-income couples. Even though joint low-income
penalties (like the CCTB clawback) predominantly affect women, they also
affect the total net incomes received by low- and middle-income couples. Joint
fiscal measures not only transfer after-tax incomes from women to men at all
income levels, but also transfer after-tax incomes from low-income couples to
high-income individuals, who are predominantly men.
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IV. BETTER TAX POLICIES FOR TOMORROW?
For much of human history, women have been treated as means of (re)production
and social provisioning rather than as individuals who are and should be equal
owners and producers of wealth and wellbeing. As the doctrine of coverture
has slowly given way to the extension of growing numbers of civil and political
rights to women since the 1920s, however, tax and spending laws have increasingly reflected the assumptions and ideologies of coverture in fiscal forms during
that same period of time. Nearly a century ago, early couple-based provisions
introduced into the Income War Tax Act built women’s economic dependency
into the allocation of tax liability by providing tax bonuses for male breadwinners and tax penalties for dual-earner couples. After a short suspension of this
mechanism during WWII, those provisions were reinstated and have increased
in numbers ever since. There are now well over a hundred joint tax and benefit
measures in the ITA alone, each of which ties women’s financial status to that of
presumptively supporting and mainly male partners. Since 2006, accelerating
detaxation and the expanded use of capital- and business-friendly tax expenditures have privatized foregone tax revenues or fiscal space to an unprecedented
extent, and, in conjunction with austerity and deficit-reduction budget cuts to
compensate for lost revenues, the total tax and expenditure system has pushed
women further into already unequal economic gender relations in both the
private and public spheres.
All three trends—increasing use of detaxation, tax expenditures, and joint
fiscal measures to privatize fiscal space—create hidden barriers to women’s slow
movement towards economic equality. Women received only 37% of the 2012
detaxation tax cuts, and this gender gap will operate on a continuing basis to
incrementally increase men’s after-tax incomes relative to women’s in every year
these tax cuts remain in effect. Gender gaps in overall tax expenditures are only
slightly smaller: in 2010, women received only 38% of total tax expenditures,
which again incrementally increases men’s after-tax incomes relative to women’s
on a continuing basis. With large maldistributions like this built into the largest
revenue laws, there is simply no way women can hope to ever get to 50% of
after-tax incomes.
In contrast with detaxation and tax expenditures, the after-tax costs of joint
tax and benefit items are not just gender unequal but actively penalize women as
a class while simultaneously benefitting men as a class. In 2012, this special set of
tax and expenditure provisions removed $25.8 billion from married/cohabiting
women’s consumable incomes at the same time that it placed an additional $7.5
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billion in after-tax benefits in men’s hands. The difference—$18.3 billion—was
left in government coffers, further increasing governmental capacities to continue
providing gender-unbalanced expenditures and tax breaks that statistically go
disproportionately to male taxpayers. Between the incentive/penalty effects of
such joint fiscal mechanisms and the sheer quantity of women’s lost after-tax
incomes, joint tax and spending items thus extracted $25.8 billion in after-tax
incomes from cohabiting or married women and divided it between presumed
male breadwinners and governments themselves. It is worth noting that these
joint tax and benefit provisions do not benefit all men equally: Women at all
income levels lose after-tax incomes to joint fiscal measures, but so do low- and
middle-income men.
In short, joint fiscal measures accelerate the concentration of after-tax
incomes and wealth in the hands of those with the very highest incomes, who
are disproportionately males. Unfortunately, the federal government has not
yet grasped the importance of reshaping tax and spending policies around core
principles of gender equality. Instead, it has further pursued the use of joint fiscal
measures and moved ahead to introduce substantial new joint tax measures in
the form of parental income splitting tax credits effective in 2014. This new joint
measure, now called the “Family Tax Cut Credit,” will shift at least another $2
billion in tax benefits to supporting spouses or cohabitants each year. This shift
in turn will increase the total cost to women of joint fiscal instruments even more
each year, as depicted in Table 9.
There are many better alternatives: Canadian governments can follow the
lead of countries that have re-examined the relationships among fiscal capacity,
government programs, and human welfare. Restoring fiscal capacity, establishing
direct public care resources and public services to replace tax expenditures, and
repealing joint fiscal laws can reverse the processes outlined in this article, and
can set Canadians on a course to a far better tomorrow. Canadian governments
have already proven in the past that they can generate adequate revenues more
equitably and can prioritize the wellbeing of all people, not just those with high
incomes and great wealth. What governments must do differently going forward,
however, is ensure that all fiscal policy analysis begins by examining how each new
and old policy affects women and treat women’s economic equality as absolutely
essential to getting to those better tomorrows as soon as possible.
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TABLE 9: EFFECT OF FAMILY INCOME SPLITTING BY FAMILY TYPE, GENDER, AND
DECILE, CANADA, 2014
Range of
total family
incomes in
each decile

$ of $2
bill.
to single
parent
families

$ of $2
billion to
1 two-parent
families

% of $2
bill.
in each
decile

% of $2 bill.
to women
main earners
in each
decile

% of $2 bill.
to men
main earners
in each
decile

Up to $19,200

$0

$0 million

0%

0%

0%

$19,201 – $27,400

$0

$0 million

0%

0%

0%

$27,401 – $37,700

$0

$1 million

0.1%

0%

0.1%

$37,701 – $47,700

$0

$18 million

0.9%

0.2%

0.7%

$47,701 – $59,600

$0

$64 million

3.3%

0.7%

2.6%

$59,601 – $74,100

$0

$147 million

7.6%

0.8%

6.8%

$74,101 – $92,200

$0

$291 million

15.0%

1.6%

13.4%

$92,201–$116,200

$0

$475 million

24.6%

4.0%

20.6%

$116,201–$157,400

$0

$435 million

22.5%

3.4%

19.1%

$157,401 and up

$0

$502 million

26.0%

4.0%

22.0%

SOURCE: SPSD/M v 20 estimate, supra note 34.
NOTE: Deciles and results have been rounded.

